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Summary
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is cur-
rently seeking to strengthen civilian protection in Soma-
lia while moving on the offensive against al-Shabaab. By 
drawing lessons from Afghanistan, where the Internation-
al Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been faced with the 
same kind of insurgency-scenario and the measures tak-
en to protect are very similar, this policy brief highlights 
the limitations of an approach to protection that focuses 
merely on protecting civilians from ‘collateral damage’ in 
the fight against insurgents. First, civilians in this scenario 
tend to care more about the total number of deaths than 
who is actually responsible. Similarly, they are often more 
worried about the presence of violence than that of either 
party. Second, even when territory is successfully seized at 
minimum civilian costs, it does not necessarily reduce the 
threat to civilians from insurgents as they will then have 
stronger incentives to use violence. Third, even in areas 
where the threat from insurgents is successfully reduced, 
this threat may only shift elsewhere, because insurgents 
can attack anywhere and still achieve the same destabil-
ising effect. The biggest challenge for AMISOM will be to 
mainstream protection into its operations in ways that will 
not merely reduce the threat from AMISOM’s own forces, 
but also the threat from al-Shabaab in areas they capture. 
This will require a mission-specific strategy for protect-
ing civilians that considers why and how insurgents like 
al-Shabaab use violence against civilians in the first place.
Introduction
This year, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AM-
ISOM) has stepped up its offensive against al-Shabaab 
– first by consolidating control over Mogadishu, and 
now seizing key towns in southern and central re-
gions. From February 2012, AMISOM also has been 
explicitly mandated to ‘take all necessary measures 
[…] to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and oth-
er armed opposition groups’.1 During its operations, 
protection of civilians has arisen as a primary concern 
due to accusations of indiscriminate shelling of civil-
ian areas by AMISOM and the potentially damaging 
effect casualties have on the mission’s credibility.
This policy brief draws three lessons from the Inter-
national Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’s operations 
in Afghanistan that may inform the on-going process 
of ‘mainstreaming’ protection into AMISOM’s opera-
tions. There are two reasons for drawing parallels to 
Afghanistan. First, the measures that AMISOM has 
taken to reduce the number of civilian casualties in 
Somalia are very similar to those taken in Afghani-
stan. Second, the particular type of scenario in which 
both missions have found themselves, is one where 
they are seeking to protect civilians whilst fighting an 
insurgency. In this paper it is argued that the threat 
to civilians in these scenarios cannot be addressed 
merely through measures that focus on ‘how not to 
kill’ civilians during one’s own operations, as charac-
terises the situation in Afghanistan and is the current 
approach also taken in Somalia. 
1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2036 (22 February, 
2012).
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The AU and Protection of Civilians
Protection of civilians is defined differently by human-
itarian, political and military actors, but any effort to 
‘mainstream’ it into the operations of a mission must 
begin with defining the type of threat one is meant 
to protect civilians from. Previous studies have found 
that the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) view protection of ci-
vilians fundamentally differently and that this is re-
flected in how they implement it on the ground.2 The 
UN views protection of civilians more like an end in 
itself – as something intrinsic to its existence as an 
organisation meant to save civilians from the scourge 
of war. As such, the UN has adopted a broad defini-
tion of protection in its peacekeeping operations, as 
reducing all kinds of threats to civilians, based on 
three pillars: protection through political process; pro-
tection from physical violence; and by establishing a 
protective environment.3 By contrast, NATO’s mission 
in Afghanistan sees protection as a means of defeat-
ing the insurgency based on ‘insurgent math’, which 
holds that ‘every civilian casualty creates an additional 
20 insurgents’, and because it erodes the credibility of 
the mission.4 Thus, ISAF defines protection of civil-
ians as reducing the threat from their own operations 
and have focused on ‘how not to kill’ civilians them-
selves by restricting their escalation of force, use of 
air-support and establishing a Civilian Casualty (CIV-
CAS) Tracking Cell.
In recent years, the AU too has developed its own ap-
proach to protection of civilians for its peace support 
operations.5 In 2010, the AU Commission developed 
‘Draft Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians’ whose 
purpose is to provide strategic guidance for specific 
missions tasked with implementing protection at the 
operational and tactical levels. Like the UN, the AU 
defines protection broadly as reducing all kinds of 
threat to civilians – through a political process; protec-
tion from physical violence; by establishing a protec-
tive environment; and even add an extra tier on top of 
that of the UN, which is protection through respect for 
human rights.6 
On the ground, however, AMISOM is nothing like a 
UN peacekeeping operation, as it has been deployed 
without the consent of al-Shabaab and in support of 
the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG), 
and it employs force beyond merely in self-defence. 
Neither ISAF nor AMISOM has an explicit mandate 
to protect civilians, but both have realised that doing 
so is critical to the outcome of its operation in line 
with ‘population-centric’ counterinsurgency doctrine, 
which holds that the Afghan and Somali populations 
are centres of gravity that must be defended. Follow-
ing criticism regarding indiscriminate use of force 
by AMISOM, violent abuses by the TFG forces it is 
there to support, and in light of how collateral damage 
feeds al-Shabaab’s propaganda, AMISOM has taken 
a number of steps that have effectively reduced the 
number of civilian casualties caused by its operations. 
These are very similar to ISAF’s – most notably the 
implementation of an Indirect Fire Policy (IDF) and 
consideration for the establishment of a Civilian Casu-
alty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC).7 
Its main challenge, however, is that AMISOM now 
finds itself caught between two fundamentally differ-
ent ideas of what kind of protection it is meant to pro-
vide – the UN-like guidelines whose broad definition it 
has been decided should be mainstreamed into its op-
erations; and its current measures on the ground that 
resembles NATO’s ‘how not to kill civilians ourselves’-
approach. This naturally begs the question: which of 
the two approaches will be the most useful in Somalia?
Lessons from Afghanistan 
Three lessons from Afghanistan suggest that the ‘how 
not to kill’-approach is not sufficient for protecting ci-
vilians in situations like the one facing AMISOM in 
Somalia. In insurgency-scenarios, the ‘how not to kill’-
approach falls short of protecting civilians as it often 
fails to reduce the threat posed by insurgents in the 
long term, which is key to success in population-cen-
tric counterinsurgencies.8  
1. Civilians may care more about the total number of 
deaths than who is actually responsible.
By implementing protection-measures like those 
mentioned above, ISAF has successfully reduced the 
number of civilian casualties resulting from their own 
actions. The proportion of civilians killed by ISAF and 
Afghan forces has dropped from 41 % in 2007 to 14 
% in 2011, meaning insurgents are now responsible 
for the great majority of civilian deaths.9 Yet, although 
these developments are frequently cited by ISAF as 
successful protection, the total number of civilians 
7 CIVIC (2011), Civilian Harm in Somalia – Creating an Appropriate 
Response, (Washington: CIVIC). 
8 The ‘insurgency’-scenario is one of the eight scenarios currently 
being developed at the Norwegian Defence Research Establish-
ment (FFI). See the author’s description at the end for more in-
formation.
9 Comparing figures from UNAMA (2009), ‘Afghanistan: An-
nual Report 2008’, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UN-
AMA/human%20rights/UNAMA_09february-Annual%20Re-
port_PoC%202008_FINAL_11Feb09.pdf, and UNAMA (2012), 
‘Afghanistan: Annual Report 2011’, http://unama.unmissions.
org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/UNAMA%20POC%20
2011%20Report_Final_Feb%202012.pdf. 
2 See Beadle, Alexander William (2010), ‘Protection of civilians in 
theory – a comparison of UN and Nato approaches’, FFI-report 
2010/02453 (Kjeller: FFI); and Kjeksrud et al. (2011), ‘Protection 
of civilians in armed conflict – comparing organisational ap-
proaches’, FFI-report 2011/01888 (Kjeller: FFI). 
3 DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians 
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2010).
4 ‘McChrystal: Civilian deaths endanger mission’, Marine 
Corps Times, 2 June 2010,  http://www.marinecorpstimes.
com/news/2010/05/military_afghanistan_civilian_
casualties_053010w
5 For an overview of the AU’s approach to protection, see Lotze’s 
chapter in Kjeksrud et al. (2011). For an up-to-date summary of 
AU’s protection-efforts in Somalia specifically, see Lotze, W. and 
Kasumba, Y. (2012), ‘AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in 
Somalia’, Conflict Trends, No. 2, pp. 17-24.
6 This can be explained by the fact that they were drafted before 
the UN’s operational concept. The AU’s guidelines, however, 
still remain only in draft form.
3killed in Afghanistan has never been higher – having 
risen every year from 1,523 to 3,021 in the same pe-
riod.10 
The total number of civilian deaths matter most be-
cause studies have shown that people who fear for 
their lives tend to support whoever can provide a basic 
form of security, regardless of ideological conviction.11 
In Afghanistan, more than half the population say 
they fear for their personal safety and the feeling of 
insecurity per se rather than the presence of Taliban or 
outside interference has been identified as the primary 
reason.12  Surprisingly, more people feel victimized by 
foreign force actions than insurgent actions, despite 
the overwhelming number of civilians killed by anti-
government forces.13 This illustrates why a mission 
fighting an insurgency has a strategic problem when 
it fails to protect civilians in general – regardless of 
who actually kills them.
2. Even when territory is successfully seized at minimum 
civilian costs, it does not necessarily reduce the threat to 
civilians from insurgents. 
A case in point was Operation Moshtarak in Febru-
ary 2010, which was the largest ISAF offensive since 
the fall of the Taliban. It was rightly praised for the 
precautionary measures it took to avoid civilian casu-
alties compared to previous operations, but still failed 
to provide security for the populati0n in subsequent 
months. This can be explained by the insurgents’ ra-
tionale for using violence in the first place. Insurgents 
primarily use violence ‘to enforce the compliance of a 
civilian population or to act as a deterrent to prevent 
them from supporting the other side’.14 At the same 
time, they must avoid ‘indiscriminate’ violence in the 
sense of it being too random, because civilians must 
feel that cooperation guarantees them some sense of 
security when insurgents are in control.  
When insurgents are ‘cleared’, insurgent violence 
against civilians is likely to increase precisely because 
insurgents feel they must deter the population from 
supporting the government. Although the key town 
of Marjah was captured on the first day of Operation 
Moshtarak, daily bomb explosions, gun battles, and a 
‘virulent campaign of intimidation’ were reported in 
the months that followed.15 Six months after the opera-
tion began, an opinion poll showed that 73 % both felt 
even more negative about foreign forces now than a 
year ago (under the Taliban) and that NATO forces did 
not protect them.16 This shows that, if the success of a 
mission rests on making civilians safer, then seizing 
territory at minimum civilian casualties does not nec-
essarily lead to increased protection when the enemy 
is an insurgent force.
3. Even if the threat from insurgents is successfully reduced 
in one area, it may easily shift elsewhere.
The campaigns of intimidation and indiscriminate 
attacks in areas seized during Operation Moshtarak 
were eventually countered through constant patrols 
and permanent security presence, which demon-
strates how protection from insurgents is possible in 
population-centric counterinsurgency. Doing popula-
tion-centric counterinsurgency everywhere, however, 
is impossible. But more importantly, even if one suc-
ceeds in one area, it does not necessarily mean that 
protection is achieved in the area of operations as a 
whole – as illustrated by the increased civilian deaths 
in Afghanistan. Whilst security has been established 
in southern areas of Afghanistan where fighting has 
traditionally been concentrated, there has been in-
creased insurgent activity in south-eastern, eastern 
and central regions instead.17 Insurgents can do this 
because their violence against civilians is only a tactic 
intended to destabilise the country, so they can threat-
en and attack civilians anywhere, anytime and still at-
tain the same effect. When facing military defeat, in-
surgents may simply choose to withdraw, as they did 
during Operation Moshtarak (2010) and from Afgooye 
(2012) in Somalia.
The main finding from these three lessons is that the 
‘how not to kill’-approach alone can only really reduce 
the threat posed by yourself, not that by the insur-
gents. Local protection from insurgent threats is pos-
sible through presence and patrols, but doing so in 
one area will not necessarily protect civilians in the 
area of operation as a whole. The limitations of what 
military force can do to protect civilians when faced 
with insurgents are obvious from experiences in Af-
ghanistan, but it can still be used with purpose when 
employed within a more suitable approach. 
Recommendations for AMISOM 
At the latest workshop on mainstreaming protection 
of civilians into AMISOM (in June 2012), the need for 
10 UNAMA (2012), p. 1.
11 See e.g. Kalyvas, S. (2006), The Logic of Violence in Civil War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
12 The Asia Foundation (2011), ‘Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of 
the Afghan People’, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/
TAF2011AGSurvey.pdf, p. 21, 27. 
13 Ibid., p. 31.
14 Slim, Hugo (2007), Killing Civilians (London: Hurst & Compa-
ny), p. 143.
15 ‘Taliban Adjust, Wage Bomb Attacks in Afghan Town’, ABC 
News International, 20 March 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/In-
ternational/wireStory?id=10156609; ‘Test of counterinsurgency 
strategy in Afghanistan’, Los Angeles Times, 25 June 2010, http://
articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/25/world/la-fg-afghanistan-mar-
ja-20100625.
15 ‘Taliban Adjust, Wage Bomb Attacks in Afghan Town’, ABC 
News International, 20 March 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/In-
ternational/wireStory?id=10156609; ‘Test of counterinsurgency 
strategy in Afghanistan’, Los Angeles Times, 25 June 2010, http://
articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/25/world/la-fg-afghanistan-mar-
ja-20100625.
16 ‘Afghanistan: The Relationship Gap’, ICOS, July 2010, http://
www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/afghanistan_relationship_
gap.pdf, p. 23, 29
 17 UNAMA (2012); International Crisis Group (2011), ‘The In-
surgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland’, 27 June 2011, http://
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/af-
ghanistan/207%20The%20Insurgency%20in%20Afghani-
stans%20Heartland.pdf.
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a mission-specific strategy for protection of civilians in 
Somalia was highlighted in particular. As the mission 
now expands beyond Mogadishu, such a strategy will 
have to reconcile the need to protect civilians with the 
realities of fighting a war on the ground. The lessons 
from Afghanistan provide the basis for some recom-
mendations towards this:
• AMISOM must expand their definition of protec-
tion to include more than reducing the threats 
posed by their own actions.
AMISOM must continue its efforts to address the 
already identified challenges for AMISOM in reduc-
ing collateral damage, which particularly relates to in-
creased discipline amongst own troops, reparations, 
implementing the civilian casualty tracking cell, and 
work to increase national accountability for the viola-
tions by the TFG forces.18 At the same time, protection 
of civilians from a broader definition of threats will be 
equally important because it carries the key to even-
tual success and possible exit for AMISOM. Doing so 
will require the mission to reduce all kinds of threats, 
as outlined in the AU guidelines.
• Remember al-Shabaab’s strategy of violence against 
civilians.
Knowledge of al-Shabaab’s particular strategy of vio-
lence will provide information about why, where and 
when they need to conduct attacks on civilians, not 
just government targets.19 It is commonly assumed 
that clearing insurgents will eventually lead to protec-
tion of civilians, but the process itself may jeopardize 
the strategic objective. Destroying or coercing insur-
gents militarily may curb the prospects of achieving 
their political objective, but violence against civilians, 
which insurgents employ merely as a tactic, is un-
likely to stop until they are politically accommodated 
or completely defeated. It is flawed to think that in-
surgents can be coerced into stopping their attacks on 
civilians when this is not their primary intention in 
the first place – they can simply adopt new methods to 
attack in a geographically different area. Taliban was 
easily driven out initially, but eventually returned as 
a force to be reckoned with that has maintained and 
even increased the threat to civilians. This should 
serve as a warning to AMISOM as it is following a 
similar approach against al-Shabaab. Offensive opera-
tions against insurgents are required to restore gov-
ernment control, but not necessarily for protecting 
civilians, who often see the presence of violence rather 
than insurgents or counterinsurgency as the main se-
curity problem. These two imperatives must be bal-
anced when seeking to do both.
• Consider the risk of retaliation when planning for 
the next offensives.
One possible way of reconciling the need to fight an 
insurgency with the need to reduce the threat to civil-
ians by all sides would be to consider the risk of re-
taliation (from both al-Shabaab and TFG forces) when 
planning which areas to clear next. Discussion over 
this will already be influenced by political, military and 
logistical factors, but a protection-strategy should tap 
into this process by assessing the risk of increased vio-
lence specifically targeted against civilians too. Going 
after strongholds usually makes sense when military 
defeat is one’s objective, but because insurgents have 
stronger incentives to target civilians in contested ar-
eas than in areas under their control, doing so is likely 
to increase the risk of retaliation to punish ‘collabo-
ration’ with the enemy, especially if they regain con-
trol at a later stage. The same could happen with TFG 
forces, as village or tribal membership is often used as 
a proxy for collaboration with the enemy. If the risk of 
retaliation against civilians is considered, the sequenc-
ing of areas to be seized may have to be reversed as 
contested areas are secured before strongholds. 18 Lotze & Kasumba (2012), p. 23-24.19 Also as it changes. Forthcoming FFI-report Våge, Anders (2012).
